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Politics and the Professions in a time of crisis 
 
Abstract 
Class analysis has undergone a ‘cultural turn’ in recent years, driven most notably 
by the growing influence of the work of Pierre Bourdieu. We seek to connect this 
perspective with organization studies via an analysis of the political, economic and 
cultural cleavages that exist within a sample of professionals, managers and 
executives – summarily, the UK professional class. The results show that significant 
cleavages exist within the UK professional class in terms of economic and cultural 
capital composition and political dispositions. However, the most significant 
differences observable are not related to classic materialist ‘left’ and ‘right’ 
perspectives as recent research elsewhere suggests, but on more epiphenomenal 
issues such as immigration, equal rights and the environment. In an era where the 
professions find themselves in crisis (Leicht, 2016), the results imply that 
professional groups should take politics more seriously and actively articulate how 
professional expertise can contribute to the common good.  
 
 
Keywords: professional class; Multiple Correspondence Analysis; Bourdieu; political 
dispositions; UK; expertise 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This article explores the political dispositions and orientations of the professional class in 
the UK. The article does so by subjecting survey data from the 2013 British Social 
Attitudes Survey to a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010). 
The political orientations of the professional class are particularly relevant to understand in 
an era characterised by growing market fundamentalism, cultural fragmentation and post-
modern scepticism (Leicht, 2016) all of which challenge the value of professional 
expertise. Understanding the political dispositions of managers, professionals and other 
strategically positioned individuals in society is important because these individuals 
operate in or around the ‘command posts of the economy’ (Mills, 1956) and are therefore 
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capable of shaping surrounding structures in their own image. Indeed, many such 
individuals, whether from the private or public sectors, are key agents in the 
institutionalisation of neo-liberal reforms and austerity programmes (Reed and Wallace, 
2015). 
Such work is also of relevance for recent work (see, for example, Maclean, Harvey 
and Kling, 2014) which has sought to “re-connect class analysis with organizational 
theory” (1) on the premise that issues of class have slowly become less salient in the work 
of organization theorists. Class analysis in the social sciences is increasingly informed by 
the wider cultural turn in sociology and the growing influence of Pierre Bourdieu (Bennett, 
Savage, Bortolaia Silva, Warde, Gavo-Cal and Wright 2009; Savage et al., 2013; Skeggs, 
2004). However, organization studies has been slow to respond to these wider shifts. 
Whilst the work of Bourdieu receives increasing attention in organizational theory and 
work sociology very few organizational studies have specifically addressed issues of class 
from Bourdieusian perspectives (although see Kerr and Robinson, 2012; Grugulis and 
Stoyanova, 2012; Maclean, Harvey and Chia, 2010; Maclean et al., 2014; McLeod, 
O’Donohoe and Townley, 2009), instead focusing on issues of domination within the 
narrower realm of organizational fields (De Clercq and Voronov, 2009; Golsorkhi et al, 
2009; Kerr and Robinson, 2009; Wright, 2009). We contribute to organization theory by 
demonstrating the value of a Bourdieusian approach to understanding the distinctions that 
might exist within and between class fractions and, by extension, by interrogating the 
political conservatism or otherwise that UK managers evince.  
The article is structured as follows. The next section introduces the concept of the 
professional class and discusses recent work which maps its internal divisions. The 
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subsequent section discusses recent sociological work on class from a Bourdieusian 
perspective. The methodology is then introduced and the sample described. Results are 
then presented with reference to geometric and cluster diagrams. The article concludes 
with a discussion of these results and their significance both methodologically and 
theoretically.  
 
Internal divisions in the Professional Class 
The ‘professional class’ is used here, following Le Roux et al (2008), to denote the collective 
occupational categories of managers, professionals and administrators – elsewhere referred to as 
the “salariat” (Goldthorpe and Marshall, 1992) or “service class” (Goldthrope, 1982). Class 
analysis, and class labels in particular, are undergoing a period of contestation and 
reconceptualization in the social sciences (Savage et al., 2013). The salariat, service class or, as 
we prefer here, the professional class, is generally associated with higher rewards, compensation 
and career structures than the ‘working class’ (Li et al., 2002). One key argument of 
Goldthorpe’s class schema was his characterization of the service class as “an essentially 
conservative element within modern societies” (1982: 80). In short, Goldthorpe’s thesis contends 
that the service class is both homogenous and conservative.  
However, recent work exploring the professional class from a Bourdieusian perspective 
points towards greater fragmentation than is allowed for by the Goldthorpe thesis. For example, 
Marks and Baldry’s (2009) study highlights the multiple class positions with which IT workers 
self-identify, ranging from working through to upper middle class. Spence et al.’s (2015) study 
of promotions to managerial positions in professional service firms similarly shows how the 
values accorded to cultural capital are often country-specific, with French partners requiring 
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higher amounts of institutionalized cultural capital than their British, Canadian or Spanish 
counterparts. Dezalay (1995) illustrates how different forms of social capital influence the ‘turf 
battles’ that ensue among professional bodies in France. Accordingly, the capital composition of 
those occupying managerial and senior administrative roles varies from one nation to another.  
Capital composition also varies within nations, with the potential in some countries 
depending on levels of openness and inclusivity for those from different class backgrounds to be 
found occupying similar roles towards the end of their careers, depending on their levels of 
reflexivity (Maclean et al., 2012). McLeod et al. (2009: 1011) concur with this view with respect 
to the career trajectories of advertising personnel, stating that once they had begun to climb the 
ladder, ‘the influence of their social class background was more subtle and less detrimental, due 
to the social capital they accumulated en route’. Elsewhere, Flemmen (2012) showed that in 
Norway there remains a persistent division in the upper class between ‘owners’ and ‘employees’ 
as evinced by the different forms of capital that each possesses. Maclean et al. (2010; 2014) 
demonstrate how pathways into senior corporate positions in France and Britain vary from one 
country to another, with cultural capital playing a key mediating role. Overall, the group of 
managers looked at by Maclean et al (et seq) is described as “variegated and fluid, connecting 
agents from different life worlds” (Maclean et al., 2015). 
Hanlon’s (1998) study of professionals in different jurisdictions similarly represents a 
direct challenge to Goldthorpe’s thesis. He argues that service workers in both public and private 
sectors can be characterized by cleavages in cultural capital. Professionals who are similar to one 
another from either the public or private sector employ multiple definitions of “professionalism”. 
Additionally, commercialism cannibalizes public service definitions of professional work. 
Hanlon (1998) suggests that such cleavages may cause professionals to change their political 
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allegiances which, in turn, questions the extent to which the professional class might be thought 
of as either homogenous or conservative, as Goldthorpe suggests.   
Beyond consideration of specific occupations or broad roles within the professional class, 
there have been very few studies that have sought to understand the capital composition and 
political dispositions of the professional class tout court. Those that have done so suggest that the 
professional class is internally divided. A key study to demonstrate this is that of Flemmen 
(2014), whose research on the Norwegian professional class we seek to build upon here. 
Countering Goldthorpe’s (1982) depiction of the professional class as inherently conservative 
and wedded to the establishment, Flemmen (2014) reveals that the Norwegian professional class 
is actually fractured along lines of both economic and cultural capital. Specifically, Flemmen 
(2014) documents the inter-relationships between economic capital, cultural capital and political 
dispositions. He finds that, firstly, the Norwegian professional class is broadly bifurcated into 
those with higher cultural capital and lower economic capital and those with lower cultural 
capital and higher economic capital, conveniently reflecting Bourdieu’s own findings on social 
space more generally in France in the 1960s. A key intermediate variable here is political 
disposition, with the first, cultural capital rich group displaying more left-wing tendencies in 
terms of their voting patterns and political views more broadly, while the latter group, richer in 
economic capital, exhibits more right-wing tendencies in terms of voting patterns and political 
views. Overall, the professional class is presented as characterized by a “systematic 
heterogeneity in [its] political leanings that follows the divisions constituted by the possession of 
forms of capital” (Flemmen, 2014: 17). 
Flemmen’s (2014) study is innovative in that it applies Bourdieusian methods to 
demographic data and supplements this with consideration of political dispositions. However, it 
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is not clear to what extent the results extend to other countries. As the literature on the 
professional class indicates, one might expect varying results in different countries as diverse 
capitals are ascribed heterodox values across borders. The cleavages found by Flemmen (2014) 
that couple left-wing political dispositions with higher levels of cultural capital and right-wing 
political dispositions with higher levels of economic capital might not hold in other contexts, 
such as the UK.  
 
Measuring class 
Bourdieu can be considered inter alia as a sociologist of practice, the body, education, 
fields, the economy, discourse and class. While not discounting his extensive 
pronouncements on these wide ranging sociological targets, we concentrate primarily here 
on the methodological platform that he built for class analysis, which culminated in his 
magnum opus Distinction in 1979. The value of a Bourdieusian approach to class is not 
that it permits a wholesale replacement of economic or occupation-based approaches to 
stratification, but rather that it considers the interactions between cultural capital, social 
capital and economic capital, permitting an exploration of how cultural criteria are 
indicative of relative position in the social space, rather than reified in grand, socio-
economic categories. For example, it is recognized that occupation-based approaches to 
class “fail to encompass the cultural dimensions that also shape classes in the real world” 
(Crompton 2010: 12). The limitations of strictly employment-based class schema are 
evident, not only from the growing number of Bourdieusian studies on class and 
stratification, but also from the synthesis of Bourdieu with more orthodox, economic or 
occupation-based classification approaches (see, for example, Crompton and Scott, 2005 
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and Sayer, 2012). What the work of Bourdieu (1987) offers above all in relation to social 
class, according to Skeggs (2004: 21), is ‘explanatory power’. He uncovers the underlying 
logic of social stratification, demonstrating the ‘correspondence between social hierarchies 
and educational hierarchies’ (Dezalay, 1995: 340) which in France at least guarantees the 
reproduction of the establishment all the more effectively for assuming the appearance of a 
meritocracy. 
The most prominent examples of such an approach in recent years are those drawn from 
the empirical projects of the Cultural Capital and Social Exclusion Survey (CCSE) and the 
BBC’s Great British Class Survey (GBCS). The interpretations of the CCSE were published in, 
for example, Bennett et al. (2009) and Le Roux et al. (2008). Broadly speaking this survey 
demonstrated how ‘lifestyle’ was inextricably bound up with different class fractions. For 
example, Le Roux et al. (2008) distinguish a ‘professional class’ (24%) from an ‘intermediate 
class’ of lower managerial workers, senior technicians and the self-employed (32%) and a larger 
‘working class’ (44%). This study shows that class divisions cannot be explained by division of 
labour criteria alone and that more attention needs to be paid to the ways in which cultural 
preferences in relation to reading, sport, television and other activities, which exert a subtle yet 
nevertheless material influence on dispositions, can exert a powerful role in structuring 
contemporary society.  
Whereas the CCSE represented the most comprehensive Bourdieusian empirical study 
since Bourdieu’s Distinction, first published in French in 1979, the GBCS significantly surpassed 
these in terms of both empirical scope and methodological reach. Based on a survey of over 
160,000 individuals in the UK, Savage et al. (2013) mapped variables pertaining to social, 
cultural and economic capital. The correspondence analysis approach yielded seven discrete 
8 
 
social ‘classes’ labeled by the authors as “elite”, “established middle class”, “technical experts”, 
“new affluent workers”, “traditional working class”, “emergent service workers” and the 
“precariat”. Dismissed by Mills (2014: 437) as an “arbitrary typology” which amounts to little 
more than a “theory free (though Bourdieu inspired) data dredging exercise”, Savage et al.’s 
(2013) categories have been contested (Bradley, 2014) and defended (Savage et al., 2014) with 
equal vigor, suggesting that not all stratification scholars sign up to the centrality of culture to 
class analysis. Making sense of class and class analysis is clearly no longer quite so 
straightforward now that distinct economic and occupation-based classes are lacking (Crompton 
and Scott, 2005) and careers are no longer linear but often discontinuous. Even so, both the 
CCSE and GBCS studies have been very influential in wider society and accordingly they merit 
due scrutiny. 
Notwithstanding their impact, a limitation of these studies is that they fail to discuss 
politics in any meaningful way. Following Bourdieu’s early elaboration of Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis (MCA), the key objective of the above studies is to position 
individuals in social space by reference to the type and amount of economic, social and cultural 
capital that they possess. While clearly very useful in understanding class composition and 
cleavages from a multidimensional perspective, such studies tell us little about whether the 
different classes identified are politically progressive, conservative, radical, etc. More work is 
needed to map political dispositions onto different elements of capital in order to explore this. 
The present article seeks to explore political dispositions via an analysis of the UK 
professional class that elicits the relationships between the economic capital, cultural capital and 
political leanings of its members. Political dispositions tend not to feature prominently in 
Bourdieusian class analyses, but including them here permits a bridging of cultural dimensions 
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with ideological orientations. This political focus is useful because Savage et al.’s (2013) 
sweeping work identified class categories that say relatively little about ideological inclinations – 
the categories might be sociologically useful but it is not clear to what extent the seven class 
categories identified are politically useful, in the classical sense of ‘class in itself’ or ‘class for 
itself’. In other words, the present study offers insights into how politically progressive or 
conservative the UK professional class is and what such attitudes are most closely associated 
with in terms of cultural and economic capital.  
 
Methodology 
Charlwood et al. (2014) note that British sociology tends to be dominated by qualitative 
approaches. This is certainly true of Bourdieusian studies on class (see, for example, Atkinson, 
2010, 2012; Randle et al, 2014; O’Mahoney, 2007, Simpson et al, 2014; Riach and Cutcher, 
2014) with a few exceptions (Atkinson and Deeming, 2015; Flemmen and Hjellbrekke, 2016 and 
see the CCSE and BBC surveys above). The dominance of qualitative approaches is especially 
curious given that Bourdieu’s theoretical constructs were elaborated while making heavy 
recourse to large scale data sets. Indeed, contemporary researchers are blessed with a variety and 
richness of social surveys “which previous generations of researchers could only dream of” 
(Charlwood et al., 2014: 163). Yet, as Flemmen (2015) notes, “there has been an almost 
bewildering neglect of the approach to quantification pioneered and advocated by Bourdieu” 
(188), even among Bourdieu-influenced scholars.  
The intention here is not to suggest that quantitative or qualitative methods are innately 
superior or inferior to each other. Indeed, Bourdieu often used both simultaneously such that one 
could correct or mitigate the limitations of the other. Rather, the point is that a certain degree of 
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reflexivity (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) is required when applying any type of research 
method. This is particularly important when using labels or interrogating research objects such as 
that of the ‘professional class’, which might connote a certain unitary or homogenized set of 
characteristics whereas underlying such labels lies a more complex constellation of different 
professional fields (e.g. legal, accounting, medical etc). One should also be very skeptical about 
the value of using surveys to canvass political opinion, suggesting that these often succeeded 
only in eliciting the opinions of those who already had strong opinions, i.e. the educated classes 
(Bourdieu, 1979). The methodological imperative here is to penetrate beneath the superficial 
level of political opinion and to understand the underlying mechanisms of opinion formation. 
Political opinions in this sense are often an expression of a class habitus, otherwise understood as 
“class unconsciousness rather than class consciousness” (Bourdieu, 1979: 492). In order to 
explore these issues in a reflexive manner, Bourdieu went to great lengths in elaborating a 
distinctly relational mode of quantitative analysis known as Multiple Correspondence Analysis.  
The appendix to Distinction (see in particular the English translation, Bourdieu, 1986: 
503-518) provides a helpful summary of Bourdieu’s method, explaining in some detail how his 
original study (carried out in 1963 in Paris, Lille and an unnamed French provincial town) was 
conducted. The times in which Bourdieu’s (1986: 505) study was located were very different to 
the present, with individual classes arguably more apparent in French society of the day. Hence, 
Bourdieu writes of the socio-occupational class fractions with which his researchers engaged, 
including “independent craftsmen and shopkeepers”, “junior executives”, “senior executives” 
and “teachers” and finds that these map in a relatively straightforward manner to mainstream 
classes, with the proviso that “semi-skilled workers” and “unskilled labourers” were 
underrepresented in the survey.  
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To conduct the present analysis, data is required on political attitudes on a number of 
social and cultural issues as well as information related to the cultural and economic capital of 
the UK professional class. The article makes use of the 2013 British Social Attitudes survey 
(BSA, Park et al, 2013), which includes a significant number of relevant questions on public 
attitudes in Britain on a range of issues as well as indicators of respondents’ social, economic 
and educational backgrounds. The BSA has been conducted annually since 1983 and the relevant 
data is freely available from the UK Data Service. Based on the respondents’ answers related to 
their occupation groups, a subset of the BSA data was created in order to capture relevant groups 
of the UK professional class, focusing on managers, professionals and employers. Since the BSA 
is conducted on a representative sample of the UK population, we assume that the constructed 
sample is also representative of the UK professional class. Table 1 presents the distribution of the 
relevant occupational groups of the individuals included in this study. The table reports that there 
are 430 respondents belonging to the professional class, which represents 12.2% of the total 
number of respondents in the BSA. Out of the 430 respondents, 272 (63% of the sample) are 
men and 158 (37%) are women. Moreover, 380 respondents (88% of the sample) reside in 
England, 30 (7%) in Scotland and 20 (5%) in Wales.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
As mentioned earlier, the article employs MCA to permit analysis of the relationships between 
economic capital and cultural capital, “the structure of social space as observed in advanced 
societies [being] the product of two fundamental principles of differentiation – economic capital 
and cultural capital” (Bourdieu, 1996: 5), to which were added the political attributions of the 
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UK professional class. MCA is a technique for the analysis of nominal and ordinal data with the 
use of geometric modelling and the construction of clouds (spaces) of categories and individuals. 
Therefore, in relation to traditional statistical methods, such as linear regression, MCA allows for 
a more dynamic analysis of relations through the construction of spaces rather than the use of 
linear models (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010). The categories selected in terms of forms of capital 
and political dispositions help us to construct the social space and, building on this and closely 
related to it, political space, while the opinions of the individuals in relation to these categories 
help us to locate their position within the social topography of these spaces. In effect, the 
distance between individuals on the relevant space represents the divergences in their responses 
to the various categories used in the analysis.  
Two spaces were constructed: one on professional class attitudes on a number of social 
issues (political space) and one on the socio-economic background of the different respondents 
within the professional class (social space). The choice of variables follows closely Flemmen’s 
(2014) MCA of the Norwegian professional class. For the construction of the political space, 
questions were selected relating to important social issues, including government spending, 
immigration, unemployment, climate change, religion and racism. In total nine questions were 
used, which help to construct the political space using 40 active categories. Table 2 provides 
details on the questions and active categories used for the construction of political space.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
For the construction of the social space for the UK professional class, respondents’ answers to 
specific questions were taken as indicators of their economic and educational background. The 
13 
 
variables employed include, amongst others, household income to capture levels of economic 
capital and occupational group together with educational level as broad measures of cultural 
capital. Overall, we devise five questions which contribute to 19 active categories for the 
construction of social space. Table 3 provides a detailed overview of these questions and their 
corresponding active categories.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Results 
Political Space 
Our analysis constructed the political space as having three dimensions, which account for 
60.29% of the total variance in the active categories.1 The first axis accounts for 46.19% of the 
variance and reflects bifurcation in views relating largely to immigration, racial prejudice and the 
importance of climate change. As such, these differences are referred to here in terms of cultural 
liberalism. The second axis lacks a salient bifurcation in terms of an obvious line of demarcation 
on political views and accounts for 8.53% of the variance. The third axis accounts for 5.57% of 
the variance and indicates a tentative bifurcation in terms of views on inequality, government 
spending priorities and preferences for private or public institutions. We have labelled this axis 
in terms of its left and right political dimensions, but it should be recognised that the results and 
differences here are much less pronounced than they are for the results and differences relating to 
cultural liberalism. In this study, for reasons of interpretability, we focus on planes 1-3. Figure 1 
presents the cloud of individuals in planes 1-3.  
                                                        
1 We determine the number of axes based on the rate of decrease of eigenvalues and also on the interpretation of 
dimensions. The variances are determined by the rates of the modified eigenvalues.  
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Table 4 presents the categories of contributions above average for axes 1 to 3, while Figure 2 
reveals the active categories with above average contribution for planes 1-3. 2 The horizontal axis 
accounts for 46.19% of the total variance. It is determined by categories related to, inter alia, 
levels of immigration (28.1%), the impact of immigration on everyday life in Britain (27.3%), 
jobseekers’ allowance (8.5%) and climate change (7.5%). To the right of the axis can be found 
beliefs that the impact of immigration on British cultural life is positive, that no decrease in 
numbers of immigrants is necessary and that jobseekers’ allowance is too low. To the left of the 
horizontal axis, on the other hand, can be found support for opinions that immigration should be 
significantly reduced, that there is little evidence of climate change and that the highest priority 
of government spending should be on private companies. In addition, there is agreement that 
immigration significantly undermines British cultural life. Moreover, to the left of the axis can be 
found opinions towards immigrants which might reasonably be labelled prejudiced, whereas no 
such prejudice is apparent to the right of the axis. Overall, this axis is presented as broadly 
separating liberal from illiberal views.  
The vertical axis on Figure 2 is shaped inter alia by issues such as government spending 
and the provision of public services (22%), the impact of immigration on daily life in Britain 
(26.1%) and religion (18.5%). On the positive side of the axis lie favourable opinions concerning 
numbers of immigrants residing in Britain followed by mixed opinions on their actual impact on 
cultural life. This implies that respondents seem to appreciate the economic benefits of 
                                                        
2 Table 1A of the appendix reports all contributions for axes 1 to 3 for the political space.  
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immigration (hence they seek no cap on immigration and are happy for it to increase) but are less 
persuaded by its impact on community cohesion and cultural life. Further, there is evidence of 
belief that education ought to be the top priority of government spending while there is no 
evidence of belief in religion. On the negative side of the axis can be found a strong Catholic 
religious sentiment accompanied by opinions that defence should be prioritized in government 
spending. Moreover, there is a belief that the income gap is too narrow and that private 
companies are better at offering services to unemployed people than the public sector. The article 
thus conjectures that this axis represents a separation between left-wing and right-wing opinions, 
although again it should be recognized that this separation is not as marked as the separation 
between liberal and anti-liberal cultural sentiments. This is, of course, in itself a real finding.   
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
 
Social Space 
The social space is three-dimensional and these three dimensions account for 83.99% of the total 
variation. The first axis which accounts for 73.11% of the variation is reflective of economic 
capital, the second represents 7.51% and reflects the source of capital, while the third accounts 
for 3.37% and denotes cultural capital. Again, for reasons of interpretability, the article focuses 
on axes 1 and 3 as these produce the more obviously discrete bifurcations. Figure 3 presents the 
cloud of individuals for planes 1-3. However, it is worth emphasizing the rather large extent to 
which economic capital determines the social space dimensions in this study. 
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Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
Table 5 displays the categories of contributions above average for axes 1 to 3 for the social 
space, while Figure 4 shows the active categories (questions) with above average contribution for 
planes 1-3.3 The horizontal axis is primarily shaped by income levels and their sources (54.8%) 
and less so by educational level (23.7%) and occupational group (17.6%). Differences on this 
axis therefore appear to be driven primarily by discrepancies in levels of economic capital. From 
Table 5, we can observe that the right side of the axis is reflective of high economic capital (e.g. 
Income > £3.7K per month), while the left side of lower economic capital (e.g. Income < £1.2K 
per month). The vertical axis is primarily influenced by the respondents’ educational background 
(46.7%) and membership of occupational groups (39.3%). It can thus be inferred that this axis is 
representative of cultural capital. On the upper side of the axis can be found categories of lower 
cultural capital (more than 20% of the variance is propelled by individuals with a school leaving 
qualification) while on the low side are categories indicative of higher cultural capital (more than 
30% of the variance is determined by self-employed professional workers and individuals with 
postgraduate qualifications).  
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
 
Social fractions projected onto political space 
                                                        
3 Table 2A of the appendix presents all contributions for axes 1 to 3 for the social space.  
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The main purpose of this study is to examine the political dispositions of the UK professional 
class and how diverse aspects of economic and cultural capital impact on these dispositions. As a 
next step, each of the social space axes were split into three equal portions and then combined in 
order to create nine class fractions. These nine fractions were then projected onto the political 
space with a view to examine the political dispositions of these constructed classes. This was 
achieved through MCA by using the constructed social classes as a supplementary variable on 
the social space. Figure 5 presents the results of this analysis. Class fractions of lower cultural 
capital appear to be associated with more left-wing and illiberal beliefs, regardless of their levels 
of economic capital. Moreover, class fractions of high cultural capital combined with high or 
middle economic capital seem to be related to liberal and right-wing opinions. At an extreme 
end, it was found that the class fraction of high cultural and low economic capital is placed on 
the extremes of illiberal opinions in the social space. Overall, though, the most significant source 
of division relates to liberal versus illiberal views and on that axis alone one can see that higher 
cultural and economic capital tend towards liberal views, whereas lower cultural and economic 
capital tend towards illiberal views. Notably, these results are markedly different from 
Flemmen’s (2014) findings, which are reflected upon in the discussion below. 
 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
 
To further examine the political opinions of the UK professional class, the respondents’ political 
party preferences were also projected onto the constructed social space. Figure 6 presents the 
results of this analysis. Although the distance between the British Conservative and Labour 
parties in relation to the horizontal axis of liberal and illiberal opinions is significant, their 
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distance relative to the right-wing and left-wing axis is surprisingly minimal. Indeed, the results 
here are startling in terms of the insignificance of left-wing versus right-wing criteria. In fact, 
only Plaid Cymru and Green Party voters are associated with left-wing political dispositions, 
with UKIP voters strongly associated with right-wing political dispositions. The differences 
between all other parties’ voters (that is to say, the voters rather than the parties themselves) are 
virtually all explained by liberal versus illiberal cultural dispositions which relate primarily to 
apparent racial prejudice as well as to views on immigration and climate change. It is unclear 
from the data presented whether this dominance of liberal vs illiberal attitudes over left vs right 
dispositions reflects the relatively weak identification of a left-right wing split among our sample 
or the politically centrist nature of the parties voted for.  
 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
 
Discussion 
In broad terms the results here demonstrate, in line with other studies, that the British 
professional class is characterized by heterogeneity in terms of its cultural capital, economic 
capital and political dispositions. This represents a further challenge to Goldthorpe’s (1982) 
characterization of the service class as both homogenous and politically conservative. However, 
the results also indicate that the cleavages evident within the British professional class are not the 
same as analogous research suggests, such as Flemmen’s (2014) study pertaining to Norway. 
Adopting very similar categories and variables as those employed in the present study, Flemmen 
(2014) shows that the Norwegian professional class is divided along a classic left-right 
continuum, with those on the left of the political spectrum associated with higher amounts of 
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cultural capital and lower levels of economic capital, while those on the right of the political 
spectrum in Norway tend to be associated with lower amounts of cultural capital and higher 
levels of economic capital. Moreover, Flemmen (2014) finds that left-wing dispositions are 
inclined to go hand-in-hand with culturally liberal attitudes towards issues such as equal rights 
and the environment.  
In striking contrast to Flemmen’s (2014) depiction of the Norwegian professional class, 
we fail to find a significant bifurcation along left-right lines. By far the more important source of 
distinction for the British professional class from a political perspective appears to be the degree 
of cultural liberalism exhibited. Apparent racial prejudice combined with particular attitudes 
towards rising immigration and climate change produced much more polarity than attitudes 
towards government spending priorities, public versus private institutions or inequality. Indeed, 
the projection of political dispositions onto voting patterns from the UK 2010 general election 
confirms more starkly the absence of a pronounced left-right divide. This absence is arguably 
more suggestive of political indifference than active conservatism.  
Furthermore, the ‘higher cultural-lower economic’ versus ‘lower cultural-higher 
economic’ split observed by Flemmen (2014) and equally emphasized by Bourdieu in his 
reference to the former as the “dominated dominants” (Emirbayer and Williams, 2005: 693), was 
not something that was discernible in the UK sample here. There is a broad tendency for higher 
cultural capital to be twinned with higher economic capital and lower cultural capital to be allied 
with lower economic capital in the context of political dispositions.  
What do these results imply specifically for our understanding of the politics of the 
professional class? Although the results are unanticipated on the basis of findings from existing 
research (Flemmen, 2014 in particular), they are perhaps explicable by reference to recent 
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changes in Western democracies. As Mair (2006) has pointed out, Western liberal democracies 
have become “hollowed out” in terms of their politics, with both elites and masses retreating 
substantially from the political arena. Politics has become a professionalized sphere in which 
technocratic policies and temporally-constrained electoral cycle agendas predominate, with 
politicians singularly failing to act according to Bourdieu’s (1996: 339) exhortation provided at 
the end of The State Nobility: namely to “assume the function that was for a long time fulfilled 
by the intellectual, that is, enter the political arena in the name of the values and truths acquired 
in and through autonomy”. Political parties, pre- and post-financial crisis, battle for the centre-
ground, vying furiously to capture voters who historically might have positioned themselves in 
opposing camps according to a clear left-right divide. Tariq Ali (2015) calls this centre-ground 
the “extreme centre, which currently rules over large tracts of Europe and includes left, centre 
left, centre right and centre parties” (20). The centre-ground is not devoid of politics but 
represents in fact obfuscatory nomenclature beneath which can be found broad convergence 
around neo-liberal orthodoxy, austerity, neo-imperialism in the form of military intervention and 
economic globalization as proselytized by international financial institutions. That individuals 
from the professional class have adopted dispositions that permit doctrines from the ‘extreme 
centre’ to go unchallenged seems to be evident from the data presented above.  
This has serious implications for professional groups. The consequences of ‘extreme 
centre’ policies have led to widening inequality and/or stagnating incomes in many Western 
countries, in turn leading to disenchantment with political orthodoxy and the professional experts 
that support it. This has paved the way for petty demagoguery and the rise of right-wing 
nationalism in many liberal democracies. In the UK and the US, for example, governments have 
come to power that actively attack and show disdain for the values and beliefs of middle class 
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intelligentsia from which professional cadres are recruited. Professions are therefore both in 
crisis and under attack (Leicht, 2016). Certain professions have in many ways brought this upon 
themselves, wedding themselves to excessive commercialism and a commitment to market 
forces that inevitably come to attack professional monopolies and the privileges afforded by 
them. For professions to protect their role as trusted interpreters of information we would argue 
that more needs to be done to actively outline how professional work contributes to the public 
good. The public good can be interpreted in various ways, but the political apathy of 
professionals demonstrated here is suggestive of a lack of active concern with the social 
consequences of professional work. In this regard the professions themselves are responsible for 
the more widespread phenomenon of “knowledge based claims losing their caché” (Leicht, 2016: 
109-110).   
 More broadly, the present article demonstrates the value of applying a Bourdieusian 
approach to class analysis, mapping as it does different forms of capital onto broad occupational 
categories. This builds upon recent work on class in the UK (Bennett et al, 2009; Savage et al, 
2013, 2014) that has hitherto failed to explore political dispositions in a meaningful way. We 
suggest that the implications of such dispositions for society-at-large in terms of their effect on 
organizational decision-making may be far-reaching. Future research could usefully explore the 
homology of political dispositions with various forms of capital in other European and non-
European contexts in order to assess the wider applicability of the present article’s results as well 
as those of other studies such as that of Flemmen (2014).  
  
22 
 
References 
Ali T (2015) The New World Disorder. London Review of Books 37 (7): 19-22. 
Atkinson W (2009) Rethinking the Work-Class Nexus: Theoretical Foundations for Recent 
Trends. Sociology 43 (5): 896-912. 
Atkinson W (2010) The myth of the reflexive worker: class and work histories in neo-liberal 
times. Work, Employment and Society 24 (3): 413-429. 
Atkinson W (2012) Economic Crisis and Classed Everyday Life: Hysteresis, Positional Suffering 
and Symbolic Violence, in Atkinson W, Roberts S and Savage M (eds), Class Inequality 
in Austerity Britain, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 13-32 
Atkinson W and Deeming C. (2015). Class and Cuisine in Contemporary Britain: The Social 
Space, The Space of Food and Their Homology. The Sociological Review 63 (4): 876-
896. 
Bennett T Savage M Bortolaia Silva E Warde A Gavo-Cal M and Wright D (2009) Culture, 
Class, Distinction. London: Routledge.  
Bottero, W (2004) Class identities and the identity of class. Sociology, 38(5): 985-1003. 
Bourdieu P (1979) La distinction: Critique sociale du jugement. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit. 
Bourdieu P (1986) Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste, trans. R. Nice. 
London: Routledge. 
Bourdieu, P (1987) What makes a social class? On the theoretical and practical existence of 
groups. Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 32: 1-17. 
Bourdieu P (1990) The logic of practice. Oxford: Polity Press. 
Bourdieu P (1996) The state nobility: Elite schools in the field of power. Oxford: Polity Press. 
Bourdieu P (2004) Science of science and reflexivity. Oxford: Polity Press. 
Bradley, H (2014) Class descriptors or class relations? Thoughts towards a critique of Savage et 
al. Sociology 48(3): 429-436. 
Charlwood A, Forde C, Grugulis I, Hardy K, Kirkpatrick I, MacKenzie R and Stuart M (2014) 
Clear, rigorous and relevant: publishing quantitative research articles in Work, 
Employment and Society. Work, Employment and Society 28(2): 155-167. 
Crompton R (2010) Class and employment. Work, Employment and Society 24(1): 9–26 
23 
 
Crompton R and Scott J (2005) Class Analysis: Beyond the Cultural Turn, in Devine, F., Savage, 
M., Scott, J and Crompton, R. (eds). Rethinking class: culture, identities and lifestyle, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 186-203. 
De Clercq D and Voronov M (2009) The Role of Domination in Newcomers’ Legitimation as 
Entrepreneurs. Organization 16: 799-827 
Dezalay, Y (1995) ‘Turf battles’ or ‘class struggles’: The internationalization of the market for 
expertise in the ‘professional society’. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20(5): 
331-344. 
Emirbayer M and Williams E (2005) Bourdieu and social work. Social Service Review 79(4): 
689-724. 
Flemmen M (2012) The Structure of the Upper Class: A Social Space Approach. Sociology 46 
(6): 1039-1058. 
Flemmen M (2014) The Politics of the Service Class: The homology of positions and position-
takings. European Societies 16 (4): 543- 569. 
Flemmen M (2015) Book Review: Bourdieu and Data Analysis: Methodological Principles and 
Practices. Acta Sociologica 58 (2): 188-190. 
Flemmen, Magne & Hjellbrekke, Johannes (2016). Response: Not so fast: a comment on 
Atkinson and Deeming's ‘Class and cuisine in contemporary Britain: the social space, the 
space of food and their homology’. Sociological Review 64(1): 184- 193  
French M (1982) Shakespeare’s division of experience. London: Jonathan Cape. 
Goldthorpe JH (1982) On the service class, its formation and future, in Giddens, A and 
Mackenzie, G eds, Social Class and the Division of Labour, London: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Goldthorpe JH and Marshall G (1992) The promising future of class analysis: a response to 
recent critiques. Sociology 26 (3): 381-400. 
Golsorkhi D, Leca B, Lounsbury M and Ramirez C. (2009). Analysing, Accounting for and 
Unmasking Domination: On Our Role as Scholars of Practice, Practitioners of Social 
Science and Public Intellectuals. Organization 16 (6): 779-797.  
Hanlon G (1998) Professionalism as Enterprise: Service Class Politics and the Redefinition of 
Professionalism Sociology 32 (1): 43-63. 
Hebson, G (2009) Renewing class analysis in studies of the workplace: A comparison of 
working-class and middle-class women’s aspirations. Sociology, 43(1): 27-44. 
24 
 
Kerr R and Robinson S (2009) The Hysteresis Effect as Creative Adaptation of the Habitus: 
Dissent and Transition to the ‘Corporate’ in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Organization 16: 829-
853. 
Lebaron F (2009) How Bourdieu ‘quantified’ Bourdieu: The geometric modelling of data. In K 
Robson and C Sanders (Eds), Quantifying theory: Pierre Bourdieu, 11-29. Berlin: 
Springer. 
Le Roux B and Rouanet H (2010). Multiple correspondence analysis. Vol. 163. London: Sage. 
Le Roux B, Rouanet H, Savage M and Warde A (2008) Class and Cultural Division in the UK. 
Sociology 42 (6): 1049-1071 
Leicht K (2016). Market fundamentalism, cultural fragmentation, post-modern skepticism, and 
the future of professional work. Journal of Professions and Organization, 3: 103–117 
Li Y, Bechhofer F, Stewart R, McCrone D, Anderson M and Jamieson L (2002) A divided 
working class? Planning and career perception in the service and working classes. Work, 
Employment and Society 16 (4): 617-636. 
Mair P (2006) Ruling the Void? The Hollowing of Western Democracy. New Left Review 42: 25-
51. 
Marks A and Baldry C (2009) Stuck in the middle with who? The class identity of knowledge 
workers. Work, Employment and Society 23(1): 49–65. 
McLeod, C, O’Donohoe, S and Townley, B (2009) The elephant in the room? Class and creative 
careers in British advertising agencies. Human Relations, 62(7): 1011-1039. 
Mills C (2014) The great British class fiasco: A comment on Savage et al. Sociology, 48(3): 437-
444. 
O’Mahoney J (2007) Constructing habitus: the negotiation of moral encounters at Telekom. 
Work, Employment and Society 21 (3): 479-49 
Park A, Bryson C, Clery E, Curtice J and Phillips M (2013) British Social Attitudes Survey 30. 
London: NatCen Social Research. 
Randle K, Forson C and Calveley M (2014) Towards a Bourdieusian analysis of the social 
composition of the UK film and television workforce. Work, Employment and Society 
(forthcoming). 
Reay, D (2005) Beyond consciousness? The psychic landscape of social class. Sociology 39(5): 
911-928. 
25 
 
Reed MI and Wallace M (2015) Elite discourse and institutional innovation: Making the hybrid 
happen in English public services. Research in the Sociology of Organizations 43: 269–
302. 
Riach K and Cutcher L (2014) Built to last: ageing, class and the masculine body in a UK hedge 
fund. Work Employment & Society 28 (5): 771-787. 
Robson K and Sanders C (2009) Quantifying theory: Pierre Bourdieu. Berlin: Springer. 
Savage M, Devine F, Cunningham N, Taylor M, Li Y, Hjellbrekke J, Le Roux B, Friedman S 
and Miles A (2013) A New Model of Social Class? Findings from the BBC’s Great 
British Class Survey Experiment. Sociology 47 (2): 219-250. 
Savage, M, Devine, F, Cunningham, N, Friedman, S, Laurison, D, Miles, A, Snee, H and Taylor, 
M (2014) On Social Class, Anno 2014. Sociology. 
Sayer A (2012) Facing the challenge of the return of the rich, in Atkinson W, Roberts S and 
Savage M (eds), Class Inequality in Austerity Britain, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 
163-179. 
Simpson R, Hughes J, Slutskaya N and Balta M (2014) Sacrifice and distinction in dirty work: 
men’s construction of meaning in the butcher trade. Work, Employment & Society 28 (5): 
754-770. 
Skeggs, B (2004) Context and background: Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis of class, gender and 
sexuality. The Sociological Review, 52: 19-33. 
Wright AL (2009) Domination in Organizational Fields: It’s Just Not Cricket. Organization 16: 
855-885 
 
  
26 
 
Table 1 
Occupational Groups of Respondents within the Professional Class 
 
Count Percent 
   Manager - Large Organisation 159 36.98 
Manager - Small Organisation 78 18.14 
Employer-Small Organisation 55 12.79 
Professional Worker - Self-Employed 33 7.67 
Professional Worker - Employed 105 24.42 
Total 430 100 
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Table 2 
Active Questions for the construction of the Political Space 
Variable  Question Categories 
Spend Here are some items of government spending. Which of 
them, if any, would be your highest priority for extra 
spending? 
9 (Education/ Defence/ 
Health/ Housing/ 
Transport/ Roads/ Police/ 
Social Security/ Industry) 
Dole Which of these two statements comes closest to your own 
view: Benefits for unemployed people are too low and 
cause hardship, or, benefits for unemployed people are too 
high and discourage them from finding jobs? 
4 (Too low/ Too high/ 
Neither/ Both) 
CCBelieve View on Climate Change (CC) and Causes 3 (No CC/ CC not due to 
human actions/ CC  due to 
human actions) 
Letin Do you think the number of immigrants to Britain 
nowadays should be increased a lot, increased a little, 
remain the same as it is, reduced a little or reduced a lot? 
5 (Increase a lot/ Increase 
a little/ Same/ Reduce a 
little/ Reduce a lot) 
Mig_Culture On a scale of 0 to 10, would you say that Britain's cultural 
life is generally undermined or enriched by migrants 
coming to live here from other countries? 
5 (Likert-scale, recoded 
from 10-point scale) 
SRPrejudice Self-Rated racial prejudice 3 (Very prejudiced/ A little 
prejudiced/ Not 
prejudiced) 
Services There are different views about who would be best at 
helping long-term unemployed people find work and 
making sure they are actively seeking work. Who you think 
would be best overall at making sure services go to the 
people who need them most? 
3 (Government/ Private 
Companies/ Voluntary 
Bodies) 
Income_Gap Thinking of income levels generally in Britain today, would 
you say that the gap between those with high incomes and 
those with low incomes is too large, about right, or, too 
small? 
3 
Religion Respondent's Religion 5 (CoE/ Catholic/ Other 
Christian/ Non-Christian/ 
No religion) 
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Table 3 
Variables used for the construction of the Social Space 
Variable Question Categories 
RNSEG Respondent's Socio-Economic Group 5 
Tenure Does your household own or rent its accommodation? 2 (Own/ Rent) 
Inc_Source Main Source of income for the respondent's household 3 
(Employment/ 
Pension/ 
Other) 
HH_Income Household's gross income (categorised) 4 
Edu_Level Highest completed general education 5 
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Table 4 
Contributions for the Political Space. 
We present contributions above average by axis, in declining order separately for the positive and negative side of each axis 
  Axis 1: Liberal vs. Illiberal % Axis 2: % Axis 3: Left-wing vs. Right-wing % 
+ Number of immigrants should: Stay 
same 
10.40 Religion: Non-Christian 17.20 Number of immigrants should: 
Increase a little 
8.20 
Migrants' impact on Britain's 
cultural life: Enrich it a lot 
9.40 No Climate Change 9.90 Migrants' impact on Britain's 
cultural life: Enrich it a lot 
7.20 
Migrants' impact on Britain's 
cultural life: Enrich it a little 
5.40 Migrants' impact on Britain's 
cultural life: Enrich it a lot 
7.10 Migrants' impact on Britain's 
cultural life: Undermine it a little 
6.30 
Benefits for unemployed people are: 
Too low 
3.30 Highest priority for government 
spending: Police 
5.90 Who is better at offering services 
to unemployed people: 
Government 
3.90 
Racial prejudice: Not at all 3.20 Number of immigrants should: 
Increase a lot 
5.00 Number of immigrants should: 
Increase a lot 
3.50 
  Highest priority for government 
spending:  Defence 
4.20 Racial prejudice: Little 3.50 
  Racial prejudice: Very high 4.20 Highest priority for government 
spending: Education 
2.50 
  Who is better at offering services to 
unemployed people: Private 
companies 
2.80 No religion 2.50 
  Number of immigrants should: 
Increase a little 
2.70   
  Migrants' impact on Britain's 
cultural life: Undermine it a lot 
2.70   
  Gap between high and low incomes 
is: Right 
2.60   
            
- Number of immigrants should: 
Reduce a lot 
12.40 Who is better at offering services to 
unemployed people: Voluntary 
6.00 Religion: Catholic 10.50 
30 
 
bodies 
Racial prejudice: Little 8.20 Number of immigrants should: 
Reduce a little 
3.80 Migrants' impact on Britain's 
cultural life: None 
9.70 
Migrants' impact on Britain's 
cultural life: Undermine it a little 
6.60 Highest priority for government 
spending: Health 
3.70 Highest priority for government 
spending: Defence 
6.10 
Migrants' impact on Britain's 
cultural life: Undermine it a lot 
5.70 Migrants' impact on Britain's 
cultural life: Enrich it a little 
3.70 Gap between high and low 
incomes is: Too small 
4.40 
No Climate Change 3.50   Highest priority for government 
spending: Social security 
4.10 
Benefits for unemployed people are: 
Too high 
3.10   Religion: Non Christian 4.10 
There is climate change, not due to 
human actions 
2.80   Who is better at offering services 
to unemployed people: Private 
companies 
3.10 
Gap between high and low incomes 
is: Right 
2.60   Migrants' impact on Britain's 
cultural life: Enrich it a little 
2.70 
Highest priority for government 
spending: Private companies 
2.50     
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Table 5 
Contributions for the Social Space. 
We present contributions above average by axis, in declining order separately for the positive and negative side of each axis 
 
  Axis 1: Economic Capital % Axis 2: Source of Capital % Axis 3: Cultural Capital % 
+ Income>3.7k per month 10.40 Main Income Source: 
Pension 
14.20 Education: A/O levels 21.40 
Main Income Source: 
Employment 
7.30 Income: 1.2k-2.2k per 
month 
11.50 Manager - Small Organisation 7.70 
  Education: University 
degree 
6.30 Education: University degree 6.90 
    Manager - Large Organisation 5.30 
         
- Income< 1.2k per month 18.20 Main Income Source: Other 24.00 Professional Worker - Self-
Employed 
21.80 
Education: Other 15.00 Tenure: Rent 17.00 Education: Postgraduate degree 10.40 
Employer-Small Organisation 8.10 Income<1.2k per month 7.80 Main Income Source: Pension 6.90 
Main Income Source: Pension 7.70     
Main Income Source: Other 7.20     
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Figure 1 
Political Space: Cloud of Individuals, planes 1-3 
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Figure 2 
Political Space: Active categories, planes 1-3 
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Figure 3 
Social Space: Cloud of Individuals, planes 1-3 
 
 
  
←Axis 1: 73.11% → 
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Figure 4 
Social Space: Active categories, planes 1-3 
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Figure 5 
Class fractions projected on the political space 
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Figure 6 
Political Parties 
Supplementary Variable: If there were a general election tomorrow, which political party 
do you think you would be most likely to support? Projection on the political space, 
planes 1-3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
